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THE SHALLOW STATE:
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND THE NEW DEAL
Daniel R. Ernst*
American lawyers and law professors commonly turn to the New Deal for
insights into the law and politics of today’s administrative state. Usually, they
have looked to agencies created in the 1930s that became the foundation of the
postwar political order. Some have celebrated these agencies; others have
deplored them as the core of an elitist, antidemocratic Deep State. This Article
takes a different tack by studying the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and its predecessor the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), an agency
created before the New Deal. For most of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first two
presidential terms, the FCC languished within the “Shallow State,” bossed
about by patronage-seeking politicians, network lobbyists, and the radio bar.
When Roosevelt finally tried to clean up the agency, his success or failure
turned on whether the FCC could hire the kind of young, smart, hard-working
lawyers who at other agencies had proven themselves to be the “shock troops
of the New Deal.” Only after James Lawrence Fly, formerly general counsel
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, became chairman and hired lawyers like
himself did the FCC set sail. It cleaned up its licensing of radio stations and
addressed monopoly power in the industry without becoming the tool of an
authoritarian president or exceeding its legislative and political mandates.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Defenders of the presidential administration of Donald J. Trump have
sometimes referred to career civil servants as the Deep State, a secret cabal
intent on undermining a lawfully elected president. As used by conspiracy
theorists on the fringe of American politics, the term often refers only to
members of the national security state, who operate beyond the effective
oversight of elected officials.1 Recently, however, its meaning has expanded to
encompass civil servants throughout the federal bureaucracy, including government lawyers.2 Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of Russia’s
1

See Jack Goldsmith, Paradoxes of the Deep State, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORI107-08 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) (defining the U.S. deep state as
“US intelligence and related national security bureaucracies endowed with extraordinary
powers of secret intelligence collection (or access to the fruits of that intelligence)”); Michael
Crowley, The Deep State Is Real, POLITICO MAG. (Sept./Oct. 2017), https://www.politico.
com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/deep-state-real-cia-fbi-intelligence-215537 [https://perma.
cc/2HPT-6XKS] (“Beneath the politics of convenience is the reality that a large segment of
the U.S. government really does operate without much transparency or public scrutiny, and
has abused its awesome powers in myriad ways.”).
2
See Max Fisher, What Happens When You Fight a ‘Deep State’ That Doesn’t Exist, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/world/americas/what-happenswhen-you-fight-a-deep-state-that-doesnt-exist.html [https://perma.cc/6V82-FQDP] (noting
that the media and many political commentators “have repurposed ‘deep state’ from its
formal meaning—a network of civilian and military officials who control or undermine
democratically elected governments—to a pejorative meant to accuse civil servants of
illegitimacy and political animus”); Rex Huppke, The Deep State is coming for Trump, and
it’s using Republicans! CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
opinion/huppke/ct-met-trump-rosenstein-cohen-russia-huppke-20180411-story.html (explaining, sarcastically, that many of the supposed “deep state” actions against the Trump administration are being performed by Republicans); Editorial, Mueller’s Leak: Deep State
Doubles Down On Collusion With Democrats, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (May 1, 2018),
https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/muellers-leak-deep-state-doubles-down-onTARIANISM IN AMERICA
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role in the 2016 election drew the most fire, including President Trump’s
characterization of it as “an attack on our country.”3 In response, others have
celebrated government lawyers for believing it “crucial for the country that the
government operate within the law—even if the president wishes otherwise.”4
Thus, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have recently
counted Department of Justice lawyers among the ”guardrails of our
constitutional democracy” that have thus far contained President Trump’s
authoritarian impulses.5
One might expect history to provide some insight into whether government lawyers have undermined or preserved liberal democracy in the
United States. And, in fact, American legal historians have not overlooked
government lawyers, even though they account for only a small percentage of
the legal profession.6 The best studied have been the so-called New Deal
lawyers, several hundred graduates of elite American law schools who arrived
in Washington at the start of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency.7 In 1939, a
presidential assistant called them “the ‘shock troops’ of the New Deal—the
collusion-with-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/FVF8-L5FX] (arguing that the Mueller investigation is being run by “inside operators at both the Obama Justice Department and the Obama
FBI…[to] sabotage Trump’s presidency”); Evan Osnos, Trump vs. the “Deep State”: How
the Administration’s Loyalists Are Quietly Reshaping American Governance, NEW YORKER
(May 21, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state
[https://perma.cc/2HKK-H5B4] (detailing how the Trump administration views the “deep
state” as government “clerks” trying to thwart its initiatives); Julian Zelizer, Opinion, Trump
Uses IG Report to Spread “Deep State” Conspiracy, CNN (Jun. 16, 2018), https://www.cnn.
com/2018/06/16/opinions/trump-ig-report-deep-state-conspiracy-opinion-zelizer/index.html
[https://perma.cc/J8PR-3P7J] (discussing how the distrust of government institutions has
become part of the mainstream political discourse).
3
Trump Calls Probe by Special Counsel Mueller into Election Meddling ‘an Attack on Our
Country,’ PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trumpcalls-probe-by-special-counsel-mueller-into-election-meddling-an-attack-on-our-country
[https://perma.cc/HL2M-5C6U].
4
Fareed Zakaria, America’s Deep State — of Law and Lawyers, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2018/4/20/americas-deep-state-of-law-and-lawyers [https://
perma.cc/L4NY-GFHA].
5
See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 1, 177–78, 203 (2018)
(noting the resistance that Department of Justice officials have exhibited against authoritarian
commands from the president).
6
The American Bar Association estimates that one eighth of the American legal profession
works in government or the public sector. Government, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/topics/govt/ [https://perma.cc/3CTM-GAKB] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
7
For the scattered precursors, see Daniel R. Ernst, “In a Democracy We Should Distribute
the Lawyers”: The Campaign for a Federal Legal Service, 1933–1945, 58 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 4, 8–9 (2018) (discussing the hiring practices of lawyers in the federal government
during the early 20th century).
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men who really get the tremendous volume of work done that must be done.”8
Some legal historians have applauded these men (and women) for restraining
capitalism, expanding public investment, protecting workers, and creating a
social safety net.9 Others have chided them for stopping short of truly transformative measures10 or for imposing their own modernist values on American
society, politics, and constitutional doctrine.11
Because these scholars were trying to understand the political order the
New Deal created, they have mostly studied agencies created during the New
Deal. They have told us relatively little about so-called old-line agencies, the
frequently plodding, often ineffectual, and sometimes corrupt bureaus, boards,
and commissions that had little if any place in Roosevelt’s reform agenda. As
a result, we know much more about the New Deal origins of the so-called Deep
State than the contemporaneous Shallow State, those parts of the federal
bureaucracy lacking the ability to develop and implement statutorily
promulgated policies over the opposition of partisan actors and regulated
interests.12 As long as critics of the federal bureaucracy have merely harassed
8

Letter from James H. Rowe, Jr., to Thomas G. Corcoran (Jan. 1939), in THOMAS G. CORPAPERS, box 211 (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, DC) [hereinafter CORCORAN PAPERS].
9
See generally, Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty
in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL
LECTURES (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004); JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937–
1947 (1981); LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990); PETER H. IRONS, THE
NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS: A NEW LOOK AT
THE NEW DEAL (1988); WILLIAM LASSER, BENJAMIN V. COHEN: ARCHITECT OF THE NEW
DEAL (2002); JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, THE NEW DEALERS: POWER POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 107–245 (1993); JASON SCOTT SMITH, BUILDING NEW DEAL LIBERALISM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 1933–1956 (2006); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF
DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 (2016). On
female lawyers during the New Deal, consult DOROTHY S. SHAWHAN & MARTHA H. SWAIN,
LUCY SOMERVILLE HOWORTH: NEW DEAL LAWYER, POLITICIAN, AND FEMINIST FROM THE
SOUTH (2006); Karen M. Tani, Portia’s Deal, 87 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 549–70 (2012)
and MARLENE TRESTMAN, FAIR LABOR LAWYER: THE REMARKABLE LIFE OF NEW DEAL
ATTORNEY AND SUPREME COURT ADVOCATE BESSIE MARGOLIN (2016).
10
See generally, JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA 158–230 (1976); IRONS, supra note 9; CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE
STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT
IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 (1985).
11
See generally, G. EDWARD WHITE, Revisiting the New Deal Legal Generation, in
INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 132–
203 (1994).
12
The National Recovery Administration, which relied on industry to draw up codes of fair
competition, has been studied at length, but it employed many elite lawyers. It is less
CORAN
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career civil servants, this oversight was perhaps understandable. Now that the
Trump administration has undermined the career civil service by leaving
vacancies unfilled, instituting reassignments, and altering personnel procedures, a study of an old-line agency in the New Deal can provide much-needed
insight into what Americans might lose if authoritarian assaults on bureaucracy
succeed.13 The most likely alternative to the Deep State (broadly defined) is
not some natural order of freedom but a variety of crony capitalism, with favors
distributed to the powerful and burdens visited upon the vulnerable under
easily manipulated, ad hoc standards. From this vantage point, government
lawyers appear less like the “shock troops” of the New Deal than the defenders
of liberal democracy within a burgeoning administrative state.
Because it was an old-line agency for most of the 1930s, only to be
New Dealed at the end of the decade, the FCC is an unusually revealing
exemplar of the Shallow State. Created as the Federal Radio Commission in
1927 and reestablished with its present name and jurisdiction over telegraphy
and telephony in 1934, the FCC had as its principal mission the issuance of
licenses to radio stations and the policing of the nation’s airwaves. Quaint as
that sounds in the Internet Age, the FCC oversaw a medium that reached into
millions of homes, enriched licensees, and gave Roosevelt and other New
Dealers a way to circumvent hostile newspaper editors and speak directly to
voters. Despite its importance, it became a perennial New Deal problem
instructive a comparison than the old-line agency studied here. See generally, KENNETH
FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL 1 (1995);
IRONS, supra note 9, at 15–107.
13
See generally Ben L. Erdreich and Steven L. Katz, The Federal Merit System Keeps Our
Democracy Safe. Trump and the Senate are Killing Its Guardian, WASH. POST (February 12,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-federal-merit-system-keeps-our-democra
cy-safe-trump-and-the-senate-are-killing-its-guardian/2019/02/12/d1984726-2f0e-11e9-8ad
3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html?utm_term=.cf06cfd2353a [https://perma.cc/Y6SQ-FG2F]; Lisa
Rein, Trump Loyalists at VA Shuffling, Purging Employees Before New Secretary Takes
Over, WASH. POST (Jul. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-loyal
ists-at-va-shuffling-purging-employees-before-new-secretary-takes-over/2018/07/18/a4462
aae-892d-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html?utm_term=.113b780fd848 [https://perma.cc/P4
AQ-SETD] (“Current and former employees — and now alarmed members of Congress — call
the reshuffling [at the Department of Veterans Affairs by the Trump administration] a loyalty
purge that is targeting the alleged political sympathies of civil servants whose jobs are, by
definition, nonpartisan”); Lorraine Woellert, Trump Issues Orders Making It Easier to Fire
Federal Employees, POLITICO (May 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/25/
trump-federal-employees-unions-civil-servants-609167 [https://perma.cc/KY5K-ALBB] (explaining that “a series of executive orders [which aim] to weaken the influence of government
unions and make it easier for agencies to fire civil servants” may also “reduce accountability or
punish whistleblowers”).
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child.14 Congress saddled it with a seven-member board and granted it sweeping
legislative power to act as “public convenience, interest, or necessity” required.15
Lacking a strong chairperson and an aggressive legal staff to police administrators, it was wracked by “dissension, wrangling, and inefficiency,” harried by
patronage-seeking politicians, overawed by the networks, and manipulated by a
self-interested, specialized bar.16
During his first presidential term, Roosevelt never attempted the
Herculean feat of cleansing the FCC because congressional demand for its
patronage was so great. In his second term, however, Roosevelt finally appointed
an honest but ineffectual chair in 1937 and a much more ambitious and
successful one in 1939. The former never managed to transform the Law
Department into an effective check on administrators, but the latter recruited a
platoon of shock troops to revitalize the agency. Together, they minimized
external influence, combatted concentration in the industry, and resisted illiberal
policies emanating from the president or other members of his administration.
The history of the FCC suggests that without the kind of government
lawyers and other career civil servants pilloried today as the Deep State, federal
agencies that distribute valuable economic privileges can devolve into a
Shallow State, whose officials heed the business interests that best satisfy their
partisan needs rather than implement democratically established policies.
Lawyers, if formed into an insular, specialized bar, might find their own niche
in the swampy ecosystem. But if selected for their legal ability and organized
into a demanding and rewarding legal division, lawyers can successfully
enforce statutory mandates and limit partisan exercises of discretionary
economic power, even when attempted by a president less committed to liberal
democracy than was Franklin D. Roosevelt.
I. PATRONAGE-SEEKING CONGRESSMEN
Regularly scheduled radio broadcasts by nonprofit and commercial
stations date from 1921 and quickly attained great popularity during the 1920s.
A survey in May 1928 tallied 12 million receivers serving 40 million people.17 As
14

See, e.g., Doris Fleeson, M’Ninch Blasts Craven on “Freedom of Radio” Stand, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2, 1939, at 448 (describing a conflict over censorship between Chairman
McNinch and commissioner Craven).
15
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, §§4(a), 303 (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).
16
See Wheeler, M’Ninch Favor 3-Member Revamped FCC, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan.
25, 1939, at 19 (recounting the statements of Senator Wheeler, who thought that the FCC
needed reorganization to provide guidance on questions of licensing, ownership and
monopolistic practices).
17
Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L. J. 245, 246 n. 1 (1929).
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the radio audience expanded, politicians realized that a recipient of a broadcast
license would swap favorable news coverage and campaign contributions for a
state-created monopoly of a place on the dial. Their first impulse was to hand
out radio licenses much like the jobs, contracts, grants, and other benefits that
had fueled party machines since Andrew Jackson’s day. The job of the national
parties’ patronage managers was to see that each state party received its share.
Following this logic, the federal government sought to award as many licenses
as possible to solidify support for the party-in-power across the nation’s congressional districts.18 Particularly in the 1920s, as networks were still forming,
politicians were often advocates of localism. Even after the rise of the networks,
congressmen who otherwise were disinclined to battle monopolies loudly denounced the radio trusts if networks interfered too much with the programming
and advertising revenues of constituents who owned local affiliates.
But radio licenses differed from more traditional forms of patronage in
crucial respects. First, the national resource they parceled out, the airwaves,
was, in economic parlance, a nonexclusive, rivalrous good. No private party
could exclude another from occupying the same location on the radio spectrum
without the help of the state, and a grant of the use of a frequency to one
applicant foreclosed the use of that part of the dial by another. “We have a
problem entirely unlike what you have in the Public Works Administration,
where Congressmen and Senators write in regarding a water works project in
a locality,” explained an FCC lawyer, “because here you have the granting of
one precluding the granting of another, and both applicants are quite apt to ask
their Congressmen to write a letter about it.”19 Second, a grant of a new or
revised license could create interference that harmed licensees in other regions
or on neighboring frequencies.20
Although the difference was obvious to any serious student of radio
policy, it took an utter breakdown in radio broadcasting to force Congress to
act. Soon after the first commercial broadcast in 1920, Commerce Secretary
Herbert Hoover attempted to regulate the industry under prewar legislation
drafted primarily to meet the needs of ship-to-shore radiotelephony. He
managed to impose some order through a series of committees and conferences
until 1926, when a federal court decision and an opinion of the U.S. Attorney
18

Cf. RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 204–12 (1986) (explaining
how, during the Jacksonian era and into the 20th century, the federal government distributed
resources and benefits to empowered political parties).
19
Conference of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (Oct. 22,
1939), at 3, 4–5, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, record group 60, entry
376, box 3 (on file with the National Archives, College Park, MD).
20
MERLE FAINSOLD, LINCOLN GORDON AND JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 387 (3d ed. 1959).
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General declared that he lacked the statutory authority to limit licensees to
specified frequencies, power, and times. Chaos ensued, as new stations
appeared overnight, “air pirates” jumped from one frequency to the next, and
well-financed stations boosted their power to beggar their neighbors on the
dial. All agreed that national legislation was required, but they divided on
whether to leave the allocation of the airwaves with the Commerce Department
or entrust it to a new agency. A majority of the House of Representatives
wanted the job given to an executive department, headed by a political
appointee; most Senators thought only an independent commission with a
bipartisan membership could provide the national perspective radio policy
required.21 The Radio Act of 1927 was the awkward result. It created a Federal
Radio Commission (FRC) to allocate radio licenses at the public’s convenience, interest, or necessity—a task, it was thought, that could be completed
in a year. Thereafter, the licensing power was to pass to Hoover’s Commerce
Department. The FRC would survive only as a kind of appellate body, roughly
analogous to the Board of Tax Appeals, the predecessor to the today’s U.S.
Tax Court. No more than three of the FRC’s five commissioners could be from
the same political party, and each was to represent a different zone of the
nation. Because each commissioner deferred to the other’s decisions, each was,
a Senator charged, “almost a czar” in his own zone.22 Although the statute
required licenses to be distributed among the different States and communities
as to give fair, efficient, and equitable radio service, the initial distribution
favored the Northeast and Midwest.23 In response, a coalition of southern
21

PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 47-106 (1980); see also Report of the Standing Committee on Radio Law, 54
A.B.A. REP. 404, 439–442 (1929) (explaining that the only substantive difference between
the House and Senate bills on updating radio regulation was that the House bill “confided
the administration of the Act to the Secretary of Commerce, subject to a supervisory or
appellate review by a commission,” whereas the Senate “placed the administration of radio
entirely and directly in the hands of the Commission”); ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 301–02 (1941) (discussing the “fundamental”
disagreement between the House and Senate over radio regulation as being whether it should
be overseen by a new independent commission or the executive department).
22
Nomination of Thad H. Brown to Be a Member of the Federal Radio Commission: Hearing
before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, U.S. Senate, 72d Cong. 19 (1932) (debating the
political nature of Brown’s career and his qualifications to be a commissioner).
23
See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (dividing the
United States into five zones in § 2, each represented by one commissioner); see generally,
Mark Goodman & Mark Gring, The Ideological Fight over Creation of the Federal Radio
Commission in 1927, 26 JOURNALISM HIST. 117–24 (2000) (providing a general history of
the ideological conflict over national radio licensing as to whether executive authority or
agency independence would govern).
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Democrats and western progressive Republicans passed an amendment
requiring the FRC to award an equal number of broadcast licenses to each zone
and, within a zone, to each state in accordance with its population.24
The act set a maximum duration for licenses of three years but no
minimum, thus allowing the FRC to make licenses good for only three months
at a time. The short duration eased the commission’s initial task of reducing the
733 broadcasters in 1927 to a number more readily accommodated by the
available 96 channels. Instead of initiating revocation hearings to reduce a broadcaster’s frequency, power, or hours of operation, they could simply let an
existing license expire, refuse to renew it or renew it on less desirable terms, and
let the applicant try to show that the order was not in the public interest, necessity,
or convenience. So great was this tactical advantage that the commission kept
the maximum duration of licenses under one year until 1939. The brief duration
of the licenses also had consequences for the patronage system. Because
broadcasters knew they might lose their license in a negative review by the
commission’s staff or a challenge from a new applicant, they had ample reason
to be solicitous of congressmen whose intervention might save them. Even
though the FRC renewed the vast majority of licenses without a hearing, broadcasters constantly complained of the precariousness of their most valuable asset.
Conflict among potential licensees was pervasive and intractable. One
divide was between non-profit stations, owned by educational, religious, and
labor groups, and commercial broadcasters, eager to shoulder them aside in
pursuit of advertising revenue generated by the new radio networks. The nonprofits suffered a major setback in 1928 when the FRC promulgated a
comprehensive allocation of the airwaves, General Order 40, assigning them
undesirable hours at low power on crowded frequencies. After a few years of
declining audiences and dwindling finances, many surrendered their licenses to
for-profit rivals in exchange for a few hours’ airtime, only to see even this
pittance discontinued when stations affiliated with networks then demanded the
time slots for their own programming. Nonprofit broadcasters clamored for a
statutorily decreed share of the airwaves but were decisively defeated in January
1935, when the FCC opted to continue the pro-commercial policies of the FRC.25
24

These requirements would plague the commission until their repeal in 1936. See Senate
Committee Reports Bill to End Zone System, HEINL RADIO BUS. LETTER (Jan. 3, 1936)
(describing the population equalization text of the Davis amendment and noting that it was
a thorn in the side of the FRC and the FCC engineering department); MURRAY EDELMAN,
THE LICENSING OF RADIO SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927 TO 1947, 47-50 (1950)
(noting the inherent engineering difficulties the FRC faced in complying with the Davis
Amendment and its eventual abolition with a more lax standard for granting radio licenses).
25
See ROSEN, supra note 21, at 136-37, 161-71. See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL
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An additional complication arose from the need for “clear channel”
stations. Even the most powerful “groundwave” signals traveling along the
Earth’s surface died out after only 100 miles, leaving remote regions, too thinly
settled to support their own stations, unserved. Skywave signals, which bounce
off a region of the ionosphere, could reach such areas, but only if no other
station broadcasted on the same frequency. In 1928 the FRC granted forty clear
channel licenses by forcing other stations to leave the frequencies at sunset,
even if based half a continent away.26 The result was another offense against
the localism of American politics. A Senator from Ohio, for example, professed
not to understand why “a wonderful station” in his state had to stop broadcasting
when the sun set in California so that a clear-channel station in San Francisco
could broadcast unimpeded. “It is indefensible,” he protested, “that a station in
the Eastern part of the country cannot use the time of a station on a Pacific
coast.”27 It was particularly so, he might have added, when the policy prevented
him from broadcasting to his constituents over the Ohio station.28
“Probably no quasi-judicial body was ever subject to so much
congressional pressure as the Federal Radio Commission,” concluded a study in
1932.29 When the FRC required more than the year specified in the Radio Act
of 1927 to complete its work, at first Congress extended and appropriated for it
only on a temporary basis. The proponents of a permanent commission finally
prevailed in December 1929. Even so, commissioners were exceedingly
attentive to legislators’ wishes. “Who can . . . disregard the judgment of a United
States Senator?” one chairman pleaded at a congressional hearing.30 A Senator’s
judgment was even harder to overlook when expressed in person. James
Couzens, a liberal Senator from Michigan, was surprised to learn that James
U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 12-37, 210-25 (1993) (describing the struggle of nonprofit and educational broadcasting to maintain its existence in the early years of federally
regulated broadcasting, and its ultimate failure with the advent of for-profit commercial
broadcasting); SUSAN SMULYAN, SELLING RADIO: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN
BROADCASTING, 1920-1934, 130-33, 142-53 (1994) (discussing the failed attempts of
nonprofit broadcasters to gain a greater share of radio airwave licensing leading up to the
enactment of the 1934 Communications Act).
26
See Report of the Standing Committee on Radio Law, 54 A.B.A. REP. 420-22 (1929)
(speaking generally about the application of high-band radio frequencies and international
broadcasting); Report of the Standing Committee on Communications, 53 A.B.A. REP. 373
(1930) (explaining the tradeoff between rural and urban broadcast coverage caused by
“duplicated use by regional or local stations”).
27
Nomination of Thad H. Brown, supra note 22, at 22.
28
Id. at 21-22.
29
LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY,
ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 55 (1932).
30
Id.
OF
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Watson of Indiana and another Senator personally argued the case for an applicant at a renewal proceeding. Did not the two believe their presence would have
“more influence than [that of] an ordinary citizen?” Couzens inquired at a congressional hearing.31 “If it would not,” Watson replied, “I have lived in vain.”32
Radio remained a political football after 1934, when the jurisdiction of
the FRC over radio was combined with that of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) over telephony and telegraphy and entrusted to a new,
seven-member Federal Communications Commission.33 The best-connected
politicians acquired their influence wholesale, as it were, by placing their own
man on the commission or its staff. President Franklin D. Roosevelt needed
these “princes and potentates of the party” to get his legislation through
Congress and made his appointments to the new commission accordingly.34
The first chairman was Eugene Sykes, a distinguished Mississippi judge (and
state Democratic committeeman) who did not even own a radio when he was
named to the original FRC. He did have the backing of Senator Pat Harrison,
and Harrison had a chit to call in with then-President Calvin Coolidge. Harrison
also had a chit with FDR in 1934 and arranged for Sykes to serve as chair until
a lame duck congressman from New York could complete his term and replace
him. The lame duck, Anning Prall, enjoyed FDR’s blessing not because of his
knowledge of the FCC’s affairs, but because his “closest friend” was Senator
Robert F. Wagner, a vital ally of the president.35 Norman Case combined prior
political experience and patrician ways, thanks to an ancestry dating back to
the Mayflower. He had charmed FDR when the two served on the Executive
Committee of the Governors Conference of the United States.36 George Henry
Payne, a former newspaperman and the FCC’s loudest and loosest cannon,
managed to assemble an imposing sheaf of senatorial endorsements, including
one from Wagner, in his successful quest for an appointment.37
31

Nomination of Thad H. Brown, supra note 22, at 32.
Id.
33
81 CONG. REC. 9604 (1937) (Burton Wheeler); 81 CONG. REC. 2336 (1937) (Wallace White).
34
Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL 409 (1960).
35
President Roosevelt Reappoints Commission Chairman Prall for Seven Years; Confirmation Soon, TELECOMM. REP., May 23, 1935, at 2A.
36
See Brief Sketch of Norman Stanley Case, in RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, record group 173, entry 100A, box 10 (on file with the National Archives, College
Park, MD) (providing a curriculum vitae of Norman Case) [hereinafter referred to as FCC
RECORDS]; The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor 375 (1955-1956) (on file with the Columbia
Center for Oral History Archives, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, NY).
37
G.H. Payne is Dead; FCC Ex-Official, 68, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1945, at 37 (providing an
obituary of George Henry Payne, noting that his “tenure on the FCC was ended in mystery”);
Confidential Memo re: George Henry Payne (n.d.), in PRESIDENT’S OFFICIAL FILE, number 2001
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Hampson Gary was endorsed by the Texas congressional delegation
and such other senatorial heavyweights as Arkansas’s Joe Robinson, but he
received only the one-year appointment when the staggered terms of the new
FCC were handed out. As compensation, he was appointed general counsel
after his term expired.38 Thad Brown, another carryover from the FRC, had
originally been its general counsel, named by Herbert Hoover as a reward for
managing his presidential campaign in Ohio in 1932. He became a
commissioner in 1933 and served until 1940.39 Even the post of secretary,
capable of expediting or delaying proceedings, was a valuable plum. When
Iowa’s congressional delegation named it as the price of their support for
FDR’s “Court-packing” plan, the president agreed, even though it was already
promised to somebody else.40
Rumors of intervention in specific cases by high administration officials circulated widely, but few smoking guns turned up. “There is a great
delicacy which cannot be escaped when the White House takes up a radio
problem with the Communications Commission,” FDR’s press secretary
explained to a political scientist. “The story is too long and too delicate to
write.”41 One tale he might have told began soon after the 1936 general
election, when the defeated governor of Michigan, Frank Murphy, asked the
White House to find out why the FCC was investigating a proposed sale of a
California license to a Detroit businessman who had been a “staunch and
(on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY) [hereinafter referred to as
OF]; The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 378 (calling “an erratic, lazy,
undependable, amusing cuss”); Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen, Washington Daily MerryGo-Round (Dec. 24, 1938), https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/pearson%3A423
04#page/1/mode/1up [https://perma.cc/QT3D-PVPG].
38
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TIMES, Oct. 13, 1938, at 17 (noting that Gary was General Counsel at the FCC until he was
ousted due to inefficient management); Joe T. Robinson to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jun. 23,
1937), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box 210 (recommending Gary for commissioner
to the President); Spearman Resigns as FCC General Counsel, TELECOM. REP., Jun. 27,
1935, at 5 (providing Gary received the General Counsel position as compensation for only
getting a one-year appointment at the FCC).
39
Brief Sketch of Colonel Thad H. Brown, in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A,
box 10 (noting Brown’s appointment as General Counsel of the FRC).
40
Federal Communications Commission, 17 FORTUNE 61 (May 1938); SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 1937, in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box 250 (noting that Brown’s
appointment was the price of the Iowa delegation’s support for FDR’s court packing plan); The
Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 382 (explaining that the secretary of the
commission was sometimes a policy-making official on political matters, but not generally);
Rodney Dutcher, The New Deal in Washington, St. Louis Star & Times, Aug. 6, 1934, at 3.
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Letter from Stephen Early to Louis Brownlow (May 19, 1937), in OF, supra note 37,
number 1059, box 1.
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generous friend of the President’s and of myself during the recent campaign.”42
Chairman Sykes explained that the price was remarkably high for a low-power
station that served a small part of Beverly Hills and had to shut down every
evening to make way for a clear channel licensee. Sykes did not spell out the
obvious, that he suspected the “staunch and generous friend” intended to renew
the license on more favorable terms and reap a substantial profit.43 Still, after
the exchange with the White House, Sykes and two other commissioners
approved the sale. Several years later the commission granted the buyer’s
request to broadcast to most of the Los Angeles basin day and night.44
II. THE NETWORKS
A second force besieging the FCC was the broadcast networks. The
National Broadcasting Company was the first to be organized, in 1926, by
RCA, General Electric, and Westinghouse, whose patent pool permitted them
to control much of the radio industry. It maintained two national networks, the
Red, which carried popular programming, and the Blue, which offered more
sophisticated fare. Under RCA’s David Sarnoff, NBC grew rapidly and offered
listeners an increasingly diverse schedule of music, drama, comedy, and
variety programs. By the end of 1927, NBC owned or had as affiliates some
forty-eight stations, including many of the most profitable in the country. As
its affiliates grew, so did its revenues. In 1927 an hour on the Red network
between 7 and 11 P.M. cost $3,770; in 1931, $10,000. In the first half of 1932,
NBC received just under $1 million in advertising from a single customer, the
American Tobacco Company.45
The Columbia Broadcasting System had a shakier start but found its
footing in 1928, when William Paley, the son of an investor, became its
president.46 Like NBC, CBS acquired stations of its own, including the flagship
42

In re Beverly Hills Broadcasting, 4 F.C.C. 250-53 (1937) (approving the transfer of Beverly
Hills Broadcasting Corporation to George A. Richards); Letter from Frank Murphy to Steve Early
(Nov. 17, 1936) (asking that the application of George A. Richards be expedited).
43
Letter from Eugene Sykes to Stephen Early (Nov. 21, 1936) (discussing the reasons for the
delay in a broadcast licensing grant due to a disproportionately low buying price).
44
Radio Station License, KMPC (Feb. 3, 1940), in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry WW-98,
box 18 (displaying approved status). FDR also sent emissaries to urge the FCC not to award
licenses to supporters of his opponents during the 1936 campaign. See, e.g., RICHARD W. STEELE,
PROPAGANDA IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE MEDIA, 19331941, at 177 n. 34 (1985) (providing examples of where FDR influenced radio licensing).
45
ROSEN, supra note 21, at 89-91, 116, 118, 158-59.
46
Michael J. Socolow, To Network a Nation: N.B.C., C.B.S. and the Development of National
Network Radio in the United States, 1925-1950, at 82 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University) (on file with the Georgetown University Library).
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WABC in New York, but its greatest innovation was a standard contract that
barred affiliates from carrying the programs of other networks, guaranteed
CBS’s advertisers access to listeners in the peak evening hours, and gave the
network an option on other time with only four weeks’ notice.47 Through
ownership and affiliation CBS grew rapidly until it had 107 owned or affiliated
stations in 1937 to the 104 of NBC, which had adopted a contract much like
CBS’s.48 The two companies’ share of radio stations increased from just over
6 percent in 1927 to 41 percent in 1940.49 CBS and NBC owned or were
affiliated with all but 3 of the 40 clear channel stations in 1931.50 They
accounted for 58 of the 62 5,000-watt stations in 1935.51 By then a third
network, the Mutual Broadcasting System, had joined them. Owned by two
stations (one of them WGN), it eschewed exclusive contracts in favor of the
syndication of “The Lone Ranger” and other programs.52
As the networks grew, so did the financial stakes for commercial
broadcasting. By 1934, advertising for the entire industry totaled $72 million.53
Gross revenue exceeded $86 million in 1935 and was estimated at $108 million
in 1936.54 Network stations and affiliates grabbed far more than their share.55
In 1938, the 310 unaffiliated stations had an aggregate loss of $150,000; the
327 affiliated with NBC, CBS, or Mutual had profits of $9.7 million.56
The FRC and FCC abetted the concentration of network power by
favoring affiliates when stations competed for the same license or frequency.
Now and then a commissioner would make his bias explicit: “What has
education contributed to radio?” Harold Lafount demanded in 1931, “[n]ot one
thing. What has commercialism contributed? Everything—the lifeblood of the
industry.”57 More common was the tight-lipped approach of Eugene Sykes,
47

Id. at 82, 85-86 (providing that in addition to acquiring stations, CBS created a groundbreaking
standard contract); ROSEN, supra note 21 at 148-49 (discussing the standard contract’s bar on
affiliates); Socolow, supra note 46 at 154 (explaining the standard contract’s option on other time).
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81 CONG. REC. 2336 (1937) (Wallace White).
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50
McChesney, Free Speech, supra note 49 at 358.
51
Id. at 359.
52
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AND THE POLITICS OF NEW MEDIA 71-74 (2011).
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who presided over the FRC’s first hearings, oversaw the agency’s trial examiners, and chaired the FCC’s Broadcast Division, a panel of three commissioners: 1) Sykes, 2) a second commissioner serving full-time, and 3) the
chairman serving part-time.58 From 1934 to 1937 all three commissioners
decided applications, subject only to an appeal to the full commission.59 “The
calm of the deep South pervades his manner, his overheated office, his ideas
about radio,” Fortune reported of Sykes.60 “Slight and solemn,” with “a voice
so soft it almost purrs,” Sykes declared broadcasting “one of the cleanest
industries in the United States, suh.”61 He made no broad statements of
principle in his opinions for the commission but applied the “public
convenience, interest, or necessity” standard in an ad hoc and rather opaque
way to the case before him.62 The only discernible pattern, critics charged, was
a tendency to make financial status the decisive factor when choosing among
competitors for a frequency. Typically, this favored network affiliates because
bankers considered a network contract a valuable asset and were quicker to
loan to affiliates than independents.63
Radio lawyers appreciated Sykes’s reserved, judicial manner when
presiding at hearings, and when he retired from the commission in April
1939, many praised his even-handedness and integrity.64 Still, rumors circulated that Sykes was under the influence of CBS vice president Harry
Butcher. These rumors gained credibility after what became known as the
“Willard Hotel Incident.” In 1935 the FCC, acting without a public hearing,
awarded a company in Schenectady, New York, a new, high-power license.
A Binghamton station then applied for the same license and demanded a
58
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hearing.65 Cecil Mastin, the manager of the Binghamton station, called upon
CBS’s Butcher for help, but the network executive begged off. “Columbia has
enough worries of its own with seven stations and its network operations,” he
told Mastin. “If we got involved in the great number of cases concerning the
ninety or more Columbia affiliates, we would be like the two wrestlers who got
all entangled and one of them in desperation bit what he thought was his
opponent’s toe, only to find that it was his own.” Such scruples did not prevent
Butcher from kibitzing with Mastin, however. Mastin explained that he was
chairman of either the state or county Republican committee—Butcher couldn’t
remember which—and that the manager of the Schenectady station was a
protégé of Senator Robert F. Wagner and “had the Administration’s blessing.”
Butcher told Mastin that, “if such was the case, he had two or three strikes on
him.” Still, Mastin persisted and requested a hearing before an examiner in
Washington. On the appointed day, September 5, 1935, the hearing went badly
for Mastin and his team of experts, a leading radio engineer, two well-regarded
radio lawyers, and the manager of another station. “They were all sore,” Butcher
reported, “because they felt they had been given a dirty deal by the Examiner.”66
Disheartened and bitter, the team retired to Mastin’s room at the Willard Hotel and started drinking heavily. Unknown to them, in an adjoining room
were a visiting friend of Chairman Anning Prall and Prall’s son, Mortimer,
who was to escort the friend to dinner with his father. When the friend went to
the closet to retrieve his coat, he heard “loud, boisterous conversation in the
adjoining room,” including the words “Communications Commission.” He
called to Mortimer, and the two, crouching in the closet, heard someone say,
“Well, Columbia has Harry Butcher down here and they must have him here
for some good reason. He knows his way around. He controls Judge Sykes. He
can buy the whole damn Commission for $25,000.” Another speaker declared
that he was ready to pay twice that sum to retain his frequency. Later, after
dinner with his father, Mortimer returned to his listening post and heard
65

Sykes Demands Probe of Bribery Rumors by FCC Group, HEINL RADIO BUSINESS LETTER,
Jan. 14, 1936, at 2–3 (explaining that bribery was suspected as the reason for FCC’s awarding
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66
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of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, on Jan. 14, 1936, in OF, supra
note 37, number 1059, box 1. They are generally corroborated by later testimony before the
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someone declare that a certain commissioner, identified only as a “long-eared,
long-nosed, tight-lipped son of a bitch,” would tell the examiner how to write
his report. All familiar with the physiognomy of the FCC commissioners
assumed that the speaker could only have been referring to Judge Sykes.67

Eugene Octave Sykes (1934)68

Mortimer and the friend reported what they had heard to Chairman
Prall at dinner that evening. Prall later told Butcher that he did not immediately
go to Sykes, because he was convinced that “there was not a word of truth” in
67

Statement of Mr. Harry C. Butcher, supra note 66; 80 CONG. REC. 2267 (1936).
This photo was retrieved from New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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the overheard conversations.69 Perhaps he believed that, but, if so, why Prall
asked the FBI to come to his apartment and begin an investigation that very
evening is not at all apparent. Just as obscure was Prall’s decision to call off
the investigation a few days later.70 (Perhaps his colleagues’ irritation at “the
idea that G-men might be trailing them or that secret dictaphones might be
concealed in their offices” was a factor.)71 December 18 brought another
reversal when the commissioners voted to put the FBI back on the case. In
January 1937, the G-men reported that they could find nothing to substan-tiate
what had been said during the “drunken brawl” at the Willard.72 The
commission, on Sykes’s motion and after a heated debate, refused to leave
matters there and voted to conduct its own investigation.73 This proved just as
fruitless, as no one in Mastin’s room owned up to the reported words, and
Butcher denied ever having “bought or controlled” any commissioners.74
Although the Willard Hotel incident ended inconclusively, questions
about the networks’ influence and conflict among the commissioners persisted.
Over the next two years, George Henry Payne, “a somewhat eccentric St.
George-in-search-of-a-Dragon,” kept the FCC in ill repute with leaks to the
press and sensational but unsubstantiated charges that CBS had corrupted one
or more of his colleagues.75 A contributor to The Nation, probably parroting
Payne, attributed the odd course of the investigation of the Willard Hotel
incident to “squabbles between Sykes and Prall over what looks very much like
the spoils.”76 Rumor had it that the two had cases assigned to their favorite trial
examiners whose intermediate reports then reached their preferred outcome, as
the FCC’s lawyers looked on helplessly.77 Charges of capture by the networks
thus joined rumors of partisan decision-making to give the FCC a reputation as
“the most inefficient and ineffectual institution in Washington.”78
69
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III. THE RADIO BAR
A third force that bedeviled the FCC usually escaped public notice but
was a no less persistent challenge to its authority. The radio bar, one FCC general
counsel recalled, was “a tightly-knit little empire, with quite a hierarchy.”79 At
its peak stood Louis Goldsborough Caldwell. Born in the comfortable Chicago
suburb of Oak Park in 1891, Caldwell graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Amherst
College and with honors from Northwestern University Law School in 1916.80
As a young man he succumbed to the fervid progressivism of prewar Chicago:
his first political activity was putting up posters for Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull
Moose campaign in 1912, and his master’s thesis drew upon economic writing
and “the ultimate source of all legal policy, the public,” to develop a test for
distinguishing between fair and unfair methods of business competition.81 So
impressed was Northwestern’s dean John Henry Wigmore that he hired the
learned and witty, young lawyer as a lecturer for the 1916-17 academic year
and planned to appoint him permanently to the faculty.82 Jousting with law
students paled before the prospect of battlefield heroics, however. After the
first semester, Caldwell left for Europe. He served first in the American Field
Service Ambulance Corps and then in the French Foreign Legion, earning the
Croix de Guerre for his heroism.83
When Caldwell returned to Chicago, he chose a position in the law firm
now known as Kirkland & Ellis over Wigmore’s offer of a professorship.84
Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, was one of
the firm’s most important clients, and when the Colonel added the radio station
WGN to his holdings, Caldwell immersed himself in the principles of radio
engineering.85 He took leave in June 1928 to serve as the first General Counsel
of the Federal Radio Commission with the understanding that he would resign
after organizing its Law Department and implementing General Order 40, the
comprehensive plan to make airwaves safe for high-power, commercial broadcasters. (Not coincidentally, WGN received a 50,000-watt, clear-channel license
79
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during his tenure.)86 After seven months he left to open a Washington office for
Kirkland & Ellis and was said to have brought $50,000 in retainers to the firm.87
Caldwell’s reputation grew as he delivered a series of masterful
summaries of radio engineering, radio legislation, the FRC’s policies and
procedures in law reviews, congressional testimony, and reports for the ABA’s
Standing Committee on Communications, which he chaired from 1928 to
1932.88 At the 1932 convention he suggested that the ABA’s president appoint
a Special Committee on Administrative Law to regularize rules of practice and
procedure across administrative agencies. To Caldwell’s surprise and dismay,
the president agreed, appointed him chair, and asked for a report by the next
meeting, which, as it happened, convened just after the First Hundred Days of
the Roosevelt Administration, with its creation of federal agencies with vast
power over American agriculture and industry.89 The task Caldwell thought
mattered only to administrative lawyers suddenly thrust him into a political
maelstrom. He served with increasing discomfort until 1936, when he resigned
to organize the Federal Communications Bar Association and become its first
president.90 He was the bete noire of non-profit broadcasters, but even New
Dealers respected his ability and integrity and valued his help when Mutual
joined with the FCC in battling CBS and NBC later in the decade.91
As Caldwell’s career demonstrated, the ceaseless rounds of applications,
frequent hearings, and occasional appeals to the courts made radio law a lucrative practice, centered in Washington, DC. Of the 101 lawyers who appeared
86
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before the FRC in the early 1930s, 75 had offices in the nation’s capital.92 The
need for proximity to the Commission lay in the peculiar nature of radio law.
With other agencies, lawyers could rely on the “law in the books”—statutes,
regulations, and published opinions—to advise clients with tolerable accuracy.
At FCC, however, a few statutory provisions and detailed regulations on
engineering practices addressed some issues, but the ultimate standard for
awarding licenses was, as a general counsel conceded, “a very elastic
proposition.”93 The Commission might have revealed its understanding of
what “the public interest, convenience or necessity” required by writing
opinions with clear and broad statements of policy. It rarely did. Instead, the
commissioners juggled a large and shifting number of factors until it found a
combination that justified their preferred result.94 The technical and financial
capacity of applicants; their residence, citizenship, and moral character; the
need for local service in a community; interference with existing stations; the
content and variety of the programming on the station; a licensee’s broadcast
of deceptive or excessive advertising; and the extent to which the station
followed its announced schedule all might factor in a decision—or they might
not. Because the commissioners never established even “an approximate
measuring rod,” the public interest, necessity or convenience meant whatever
“a majority of the Commission wants it to mean,” Caldwell complained.95
In one case, after reciting all the arid details, the Commission
pronounces the conclusion of the syllogism: “Now, therefore, the
granting of the application will serve public interest, convenience or necessity.” In another case, decided the same week, an
equivalent or even more arid lot of details are recited, with a
contrary conclusion.96
92
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Careful students, looking back on the decisions from a considerable
distance, claimed to detect some patterns but also much that “savored of the
arbitrary” and the “capricious.”97
Lawyers at some remove from Washington could not hope to master the
inchoate tendencies and unarticulated calculations that moved the commissioners,
even with the help of newsletters and trade journals that regularly reported on
doings at the FCC. Too much of what lawyers needed to know was too intuitive,
unverifiable, or even libelous to appear in print. It could only be acquired through
observation or conversation with other radio lawyers over lunch, at bar gatherings,
or in the elevators of office buildings. Thus, proximity to the commission or connections with a Washington insider was necessary for a successful radio practice.
The best-informed lawyers had once worked for the commission itself.
“Washington has become the happy hunting ground for former members of the
FRC legal staff,” complained the editor of a trade journal in 1934.98 The biggest
game went to the former occupants of one of the FCC’s four statutory positions:
general counsel (salaried at $10,000 during the FRC years and $9,000 thereafter)
and three assistant general counsels (salaried at $7,500).99 Of the nine men who
held these posts at the FRC, only one was still a lawyer at the agency in 1936. A
second, Thad Brown, had become a commissioner; the other seven were
admitted to practice before the FCC. All save one had offices in Washington,
and they represented the most powerful companies in the industry. For example,
one month in 1933 Duke Patrick was General Counsel; the next he represented
CBS as a member of the law firm Hogan & Hartson.100 “Almost every time
97
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anybody ceased to occupy a position on or with the Federal Radio Commission
he immediately turned up as the representative of the broadcasting companies,”
complained Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana in 1935. “It is an extremely
bad practice, to say the least, for a man to step out of the Federal Radio
Commission and then go up before it and appear for private clients.”101
What troubled Wheeler was less the knowledge lawyers took with them
than the friends they left behind.102 “A man who is down there as an attorney
gets acquainted with the engineers, gets acquainted with all the help in the
office,” the Montanan observed. “He then steps out and represents one particular
firm, or one particular broadcasting station, or one particular chain.”103 His
friends stay in the agency, “and it is only human nature that people he has
appointed to office have an interest in him and may, unconsciously perhaps, give
him an advantage over other practitioners.”104
The lawyers left behind might also form a ring. In such cases, a top
lawyer at an agency surrounded himself with cronies and ensured that one
would replace him when he departed for private practice. In his new role, the
left-behind crony did favors for his former boss in exchange for kickbacks. The
crony might stay in power for some time or he might groom his own successor
and join his former boss in practice. Once established, a ring was exceedingly
difficult to root out, because those best positioned to detect it––other lawyers
in private practice––were most vulnerable to retaliation if they struck at the
ringleader but failed to kill him.
In the 1935 hearings Wheeler observed that, during the early days of the
income tax, lawyers who left the Bureau of Internal Revenue got refunds for
their clients from the friends and appointees they left behind.105 In all likelihood,
he was referring to The Great Mellon Ring of the 1920s. As soon as he became
Solicitor of the Bureau in 1925, Alexander Gregg filled its top legal posts with
close associates. Two years later he resigned and established a lucrative tax
practice, with clients that included companies owned or controlled by the family
of U.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon. Gregg’s assistant Clarence
Charest succeeded him as Solicitor. Charest, an FBI investigation found, routinely provided Gregg with special favors and secret information.106 Although
101
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thoroughly resented by Washington attorneys, the ring persisted until the change
of administrations in 1933, when Charest left to join Gregg’s firm.107
The figure who conjured up The Mellon Ring for Wheeler in the 1935
hearings was Paul D. P. Spearman.108 “More shrewd than intelligent,” in the
judgment of a long-serving FCC lawyer, Spearman came to the FRC in 1929 as
a friend and political ally of his fellow Mississippian Eugene Sykes.109 He quickly
became Assistant General Counsel and as quickly left to establish a radio
practice.110 Through the intercession of Mississippi Senator Hubert Stephens,
Spearman returned to the Commission as General Counsel in July 1934.111 He
promptly repaid the favor by traveling to his home state with Sykes and another
FCC lawyer to campaign for Stephens against the demagogue Theodore G. Bilbo
in a fiercely contested Democratic primary. Bilbo won and avenged himself by
excoriating Sykes during a hearing.112 Sykes and Spearman weathered Bilbo’s
blows, but Wheeler was alarmed by the revelations and by Spearman’s hiring of
a former attorney general of Mississippi as his assistant.113 When Spearman left
the agency in 1936 to join ex-Senator Stephens’s law firm, he lobbied to have his
assistant succeed him as General Counsel, but lost when the Texas congressional
delegation successfully backed Hampson Gary.114 The assistant followed Spearman
to Stephens’s firm a few months later.115 When rumors soon circulated that certain
political law firms were demanding tribute from those with business before the
Commission, no other group of radio lawyers better answered the description.116
Yet when a scandal broke in the press in early 1937 it involved a different
group of former FCC lawyers. On February 10, the FCC reprimanded a young
radio lawyer named George S. Smith, an associate of the former Assistant
General Counsel Paul M. Segal, for persuading one of the FCC’s secretaries to
swap an altered set of depositions for one already entered into the Commission’s
107
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files.117 The commissioners intended to give the matter no more publicity
beyond entering the reprimand in the minutes, but they did not count on one of
their colleagues, George Henry Payne, who was away on one of his frequent
Florida vacations.118 Payne had a personal interest in the reputation of Smith and
Segal, because the two were defending the editor of Broadcasting in Payne’s
libel suit against the trade journal. When he returned, Payne claimed to have
more information on the Smith case, demanded the Commission investigate
further, and leaked word of Smith’s reprimand to the press.119 The widely read
columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen predicted fireworks within the
FCC over charges that several lawyers arranged for friendly stenographers to
alter documents and filed applications on behalf of dummy companies.120 Two
days later, the columnists revealed that the FCC had commenced disciplinary
proceedings against Segal and Smith,121 and not long thereafter Payne, acting on
his own initiative, ordered the distribution of a press release detailing the charges
against them. As Segal and Smith later complained, 1,400 copies of the press
release circulated among their clients, radio stations throughout the United
States, telegraph companies, telephone companies, members of Congress, press
associations, individual newspapers, and lawyers practicing before the FCC.122
Not until October 1937 did the FCC finally commence hearings on the
charges, after first disqualifying Payne, over his outraged protest. For the next
eight days the other commissioners heard testimony establishing that Segal had
directed his female stenographers to sign articles of incorporation that hid the
identity of one client and inflated the wealth of another. But rather than disbar
the two, the FCC decided in December 1937 that Smith had done nothing
wrong and that Segal should be suspended from the roll of attorneys for only
two months. Segal’s standing, character and integrity were of the highest, the
Commission explained, and he had already lost much business, thanks to the
cloud under which he had labored since Payne’s press release.123
117
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The affair was an embarrassment to the radio bar, not least of all
because Segal chaired the FCBA’s ethics committee.124 But it also revealed an
embarrassing shortcoming of the Commission itself: its failure to prevent wellconnected lawyers from selecting, shaping, or even falsifying the factual record
in proceedings before them. FCBA leaders confessed to Payne that “certain
men are ruining the profession.”125 They adopted a canon of ethics for the radio
bar, but they could not by their own efforts guarantee the integrity of the
Commission’s procedures for gathering evidence and finding facts.126
IV. THE TRIALS OF A REFORM CHAIRMAN
The FCC might have stayed mired in patronage politics, networks
lobbying, and unethical lawyering indefinitely. Congress was unlikely to drain
a swamp in which some of its powerful members wallowed happily. The
President also benefited from discretely making his wishes known. Further,
during his first term Roosevelt had no great policy requiring a meritocratically
staffed, efficient, and wieldy FCC. As long as the networks carried his fireside
chats, an old-line agency sufficed.
During his second term, however, reforming the FCC struck Roosevelt
as good politics. Initially, it allowed him to forestall a potential embarrassing
investigation headed by a rival Democrat leading the fight in the Senate to
defeat his plan to “pack” the U.S. Supreme Court. It then helped him counter
charges that he wanted to use the federal bureaucracy for partisan ends, which
were prompted by his executive reorganization bill, his intervention into the
Democratic primaries of 1938, and the misuse of federal relief funds in
elections that year.127 For assistance, he turned to a network of lawyers,
economists, and other professionals within his administration. First among
these “White House janissaries,”128 “palace politicians,”129 and “downtown
brain-trusters”130 was Thomas G. Corcoran, a protégé of the Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter who since 1935 had been serving informally as FDR’s
124
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assistant.131 Corcoran boasted that his was “a unified command” that “watched
the affairs of all the administrative agencies.”132 He and his close associate
Benjamin V. Cohen served as the New Deal’s principal legislative draftsmen
and consultants to agency lawyers across the administration.133
President Roosevelt announced his “Court-packing” plan on February 5,
1937. Within days, Burton Wheeler, who resented Roosevelt for supplanting him
as the leading progressive in the Democratic Party, emerged as the leader of the
opposition in the Senate.134 Wheeler’s most sensational thrust came on March
22, when he read to the Senate Judiciary Committee a letter from Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes demolishing FDR’s argument that the superannuated
justices were behind in their work.135 Another sally against the president was
Wheeler’s threat, as Chairman of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, to
investigate the FCC. On February 12, he announced he was drafting a bill to
reverse the “very distinct tendency toward monopoly” in the radio industry.136
The Senate’s acknowledged expert on radio matters, Wallace H. White, soon
joined in. On March 17, the Maine Republican delivered a major address calling
for an investigation of the FCC’s role in the trafficking of radio frequencies and
the networks’ monopolization of the industry. “The light of publicity” would not
fall solely upon the Commission, White warned. “Every Senator knows that the
air is full of reports that cases have been decided not alone on the evidence
presented and the merits of the issue, but that political pressure has often been
exerted, and that it has been determinative in many instances.”137
131
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A Wheeler-led investigation was a most unappealing prospect for the
president. “The Administration does not want the smells emanating from [the
FCC] traced to their source,” claimed a contributor to The Nation.138 White
held his resolution in abeyance until July 6, the first day of Senate debate on
the Court-packing plan. As promptly and unanimously reported out of the
Interstate Commerce Committee, it authorized that body to conduct a thorough
investigation of the radio industry and the FCC. Although further action
awaited its consideration by the Senate’s audit committee, the measure
remained a source of great concern. “Scarcely anything pending on Capitol
Hill worried the President more than Senator Wallace White’s resolution for a
sweeping Senate investigation of the FCC, particularly because this resolution
would be handled by the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, of which
Burton K. Wheeler is chairman,” Business Week reported. “The President
correctly interprets Wheeler’s attitude as one of active dislike for himself.”139
One time-tested tactic for forestalling a congressional investigation was
to name new appointees to a suspect agency and ask that they be given time to
put matters aright. The tactic was particularly likely to succeed if Congress had
its own skeletons in the closet. In late May, Roosevelt was handed this
opportunity when Commissioner Irvin Stewart unexpectedly declined
reappointment.140 As the Supreme Court fight and a strike wave raged,
Roosevelt searched for (in an aide’s words) “a strong man” whose appointment
would quell talk on the Hill about a Congressional investigation.141 What was
needed, Roosevelt told his son, was someone who would “bring order out of
chaos” and, although not Chairman, “give life and direction to the whole
Commission.”142 Then, on July 23, Chairman Prall died at his vacation home
in Maine and gave Roosevelt an additional opportunity to quiet what a trade
journal called “the storm of censure and criticism” surrounding the FCC.143
138
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For Stewart’s position, he quickly settled on T.A.M. Craven, the
Commission’s chief engineer.144 The right chairman was a more difficult choice,
but at last Roosevelt settled on Frank R. McNinch, then serving as Chairman of
the Federal Power Commission (FPC).145 The diminutive McNinch, a Presbyterian deacon “much given to such Scriptural injunctions as ‘To your tents, O
Israel!’” seemed better suited to lead an adult Sunday school class than an agency
bullied about by politicians, network executives, and the radio bar.146 He also
suffered from incapacitating bouts of inflammatory colitis.147 And as McNinch
himself acknowledged, he knew little about radio broadcasting or the FCC.148
Even so, much argued for his appointment. He had demonstrated his political
independence by breaking with North Carolina’s Democrats over Alfred Smith’s
presidential candidacy.149 After Roosevelt made him chairman of the FPC in
1933, he joined in the New Deal’s crusade against public utility holding companies
by opposing their attempt to monopolize hydroelectric dam sites.150 McNinch did
not want to leave the FPC but acceded to Roosevelt’s request with the
understanding he would return once he “got things in good order at the FCC.”151
“I am sure your colleagues and the public will expect and welcome
from you aggressive and fearless leadership,” Roosevelt wrote McNinch on the
eve of his new chairmanship.152 McNinch told the press that FDR had given
him “a completely free hand” and that “my judgment and my conscience are
my only guides.”153 He made a strong start by ending the Broadcast Division’s
monopoly over the initial granting of licenses and abolishing three notorious
sinecures, held by a cousin of former Senator Hugo Black, the nephew of
144
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House Majority Leader Sam Rayburn, and a former aide of Postmaster General
James A. Farley, the New Deal’s chief patronage dispenser.154
Next McNinch persuaded the commission to record the names and
addresses of all who contacted its members about licenses and to note the
substance of the communication. Neither trial examiners nor commissioners were
to consider the intervention unless the message was made part of the record in a
hearing.155 “Over a period of years there has grown up, like Topsy, the practice
of making suggestions, requests or recommendations to members of the Commission or its staff as to matters pending by those not of record as parties in interest,”
McNinch explained.156 Congress had established the FCC as an independent
agency with quasi-judicial powers; it now needed congressmen’s forbearance to
exercise those powers faithfully.157 But it was not to be; more than a high-minded
edict was required to break longstanding congressional expectations.158
The new chairman’s investigations of programming that offended his
priggish sensibilities did not help his cause. “It seems we must be protected
against Mae West, invaders from Mars, a little profanity in a Pulitzer prize play,
too much foreign language, mediocre programs (whatever that means),” Louis
Caldwell observed, “and a host of other utterances and programs that might
warp our thirteen-year-old minds.”159 McNinch found particularly offensive a
sketch broadcasted on NBC, in which Mae West, playing a bored and
concupiscent Eve in the garden of Eden, fed applesauce to a dull and
complacent Adam and opened his eyes to her charms. The chairman’s
censoriousness roiled the commission further, as Payne echoed his outrage and
Craven objected to second-guessing the networks.160
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Meanwhile, McNinch could not persuade his quarreling commissioners
to convene promised hearings on networks’ monopolistic practices and newspaper ownership of radio stations. After congressmen renewed their calls for
an investigation, Payne went before the House Rules Committee to accuse his
fellow commissioners of yielding to “outside pressure.”161 He also blasted the
radio bar for being “in the habit of commanding rather than asking or
pleading.”162 McNinch publicly demanded that Payne produce evidence to
back up his charges.163 Journalists lumped the “feud-racked Federal Communications Commission” together with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
and the National Bituminous Coal Commission, where unseemly in-fighting
was also on public display.164 “There is not in Washington now and there
perhaps has never been a commission which was a more grotesque travesty on
Government regulation than the Communications Commission,” declared a
correspondent for the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain in June 1938.165
V. THE PURGE
At other agencies, New Dealers used legal divisions to police potentially
wayward administrators. At the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA),
for example, General Counsel Jerome Frank insisted that food processors not use
marketing agreements to mulct the public.166 Politicians impatient for federal
funds railed against the punctiliousness of lawyers at the Public Works Administration, “fellows who come here to get law jobs in the departments and then sit
down and look for semicolons and hold up the works.”167 Lawyers at the Social
Security Board tried to get local administrators to see the recipients of family
support payments as rights-bearers instead of supplicants.168 At the Bituminous
Coal Division of the Department of the Interior, General Counsel Abe Fortas
A. M. Craven taken at Washington D.C. (May 21 to Jun. 28, 1943), at 49–50, in COX
COMMITTEE RECORDS, supra note 118, Witness Statements, box 2.
161
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162
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163
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165
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166
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Shovels Halted by Typewriters, Says La Guardia, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1935, at 6. Franklin
D. Roosevelt chose Harold Ickes, his Secretary of the Interior, to head the Public Works
Administration because he knew of the Progressive Republican’s opposition to pork-barrel
spending in Chicago. SMITH, supra note 9.
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hired a team of able lawyers, including the future federal judge Harold Leventhal, to straighten out the New Deal’s coal policy.169 At the Board of Economic
Warfare, lawyers required that contracts for material procured overseas include
clauses mandating decent working conditions for laborers.170
At the start of his chairmanship, McNinch had no such ally in the
FCC’s Law Department. The general counsel he inherited, Hampson Gary, was
“known to be incompetent at the time of his appointment, just another example
of political hack placement from which the FCC has suffered.”171 Gary’s three
assistant general counsels were also political appointees. The lawyers below
them had mostly acquired their jobs as had their counterparts at other “old line”
agencies, through the influence of congressional patronage or promotion from
a clerical position once they earned a degree from one of the many law schools
in the nation’s capital.172 Many spent most or all of their careers at FCC.
Fanney Neyman, the FCC’s first female lawyer, for example, had initially
come to Washington from Montana to clerk in her Senator’s congressional
office.173 After further legal study at the George Washington University—she
was already a graduate of the Silver Bow Law College in Butte—she joined
the FRC’s legal staff in December 1928 and remained at the commission until
1955.174 Another long-serving lawyer was Rosel Hyde. A Mormon and a
169

KALMAN, supra note 9, at 68–70.
Daniel R. Ernst, The Ideal and the Actual in the State: Willard Hurst and the Board of
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II 150 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew, eds., 2002).
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Letter from Anonymous to Thomas G. Corcoran (Dec. 7, 1938), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra
note 8, box 250.
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Two of the New Deal’s first appointments to the FRC suggested the influence of Southern
Democrats: a judge of the juvenile court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and the former secretary to
Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-TN). Press Release (Jun. 22, 1933), in FCC RECORDS, supra note
36. An exception to norm was Carl Wheat, appointed at Felix Frankfurter’s urging to improve the
quality of rate-making in the FCC’s telephone division. He was soon forced out. Memorandum of
Carl I. Wheat, Telephone Rate Counsel (Jan. 31, 1938), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box
250; Letter from Carl I. Wheat to Thomas G. Corcoran (May 23, 1938), in OF, supra note 37,
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REV. 846, 847 (1938). For elsewhere in the federal government, consult ERNST, In a Democracy
We Should Distribute the Lawyers, supra note 7, at 5.
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Transcript of Hearings, Cox Committee, 7338, in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A,
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Id. at 7338-7339; Report of the 1955 Luncheon Committee, 15 FED. COMM. B.J. 57 (1956).
Female agency lawyers at other agencies also tended to stay in government rather than rotate into
the private sector because of the difficulty of acquiring clients. Private practice might had been a
particularly daunting prospect for Neyman and other women in the FCC’s Law Department, as
client-getting in the radio bar involved much after-hours socializing. The only woman among the
FCBA’s charter members was Mabel Walker Willebrandt, a former U.S. assistant attorney general,
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Republican, Hyde had come to Washington from Utah in the 1920s to clerk in
government agencies while taking undergraduate and law classes at George
Washington University.175 He started at the FRC in 1928 as a disbursing clerk
but found the job so undemanding that he volunteered for the general counsel,
whose office was next door. He joined the legal staff after passing the bar.176
Thanks to the civil service status he held from his original appointment as a
clerk, he was only demoted and not fired when Democrats took control of the
commission in 1933.177 Even well-pedigreed New Dealers would come to
respect him for his intelligence, dedication, and honesty.178
Such career lawyers performed the FCC’s routine legal work well but
could scarcely be expected to mount a sustained campaign to clean up the
agency. McNinch needed to make a change at the top of the Law Department.
He acquired grounds for ousting Gary when his lawyers’ missteps resulted in
a string of reversals by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The most embarrassing was Saginaw Broadcasting decided in March 1938.179
Writing for a three-judge panel, Harold Stephens showed that the FCC
commissioners had not carefully read the trial examiner’s report, lectured them
on the proper way to find facts, scolded them for employing “Star Chamber
methods,” and urged them to do “justice . . . according to facts and law” rather
than “extralegal considerations.”180 A journalist translated: the judges believed
that by awarding a license to a member of the Democratic National Committee
who could hold her own in Washington legal circles. BULL. FED. COMM. BAR ASS’N, Dec. 7, 1936,
at 4–6; DOROTHY M. BROWN, MABEL WALKER WILLEBRANDT: A STUDY OF POWER, LOYALTY
AND LAW 179–228 (1984).
175
Hyde Expects no Reversal of Established FCC Policies, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1969, at 81.
176
Interview of Rosel H. Hyde (Mar. 22, 1973), Rosel H. Hyde in INSPIRE RECORDS, box
2 (on file with Special Collections, Hornbake Library, University of Maryland, College Park,
MD) [hereinafter referred to as INSPIRE RECORDS].
177
Id. at 2.
178
Interview of Joseph M. Kittner by author (Sept. 2005) (on file with the author). Harry
Truman appointed Hyde to the Commission and Dwight Eisenhower made him chairman but
then demoted him after he refused to purge the legal staff of Democrats. Lyndon Johnson
later restored him to the chairmanship. Interview of Rosel H. Hyde, supra note 176.
179
Missouri Broad. Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm., 94 F.2d 623 (1937); Heitmeyer v. Fed.
Commc’n Comm., 95 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Saginaw Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm., 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Tri-State Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm.,
96 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Consult Harry P. Warner, Subjective Judicial Review of the
Federal Communications Commission, 38 MICH. L. REV. 632 (1940).
180
Saginaw Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm. 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Roscoe
Pound would quote from Stephens’s opinion in a report for the American Bar Association
warning against the dangers of “administrative absolutism.” Report of the Special Committee
on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 358, 359 (1938).
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against the recommendation of a trial examiner, the FCC had succumbed to
“political influence and the like.”181
During the summer of 1938, McNinch tried to dislodge Gary with
offers of well-paying jobs elsewhere, but the general counsel would not
budge.182 Finally, in October, after a prolonged absence, McNinch returned to
the commission with the votes he needed to mount a purge. A majority of the
commissioners fired Gary for “inefficiency and lack of administrative ability”
and replaced him with William J. Dempsey, an assistant general counsel at
McNinch’s FPC and part of Corcoran’s network of lawyers.183 (A dissenting
commissioner later testified that Corcoran had called him at home to say that
Roosevelt wanted him to vote against Gary and for Dempsey.)184 Dempsey, in
turn, installed as his right hand man, William Koplovitz, a cum laude Harvard
law graduate and his assistant at FPC.185
Other changes targeted the agency’s trial examiners, the quasi-judicial
officers who presided over hearings and whose recommendations the full
commission usually adopted.186 A researcher for the Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure concluded that the FCC’s trial
examiners reached their conclusions not so much on the facts as on their guess
as to the Commission’s probable decision, which mostly turned on which
applicant had the best political connections. Some trial examiners were said to
favor particular members of the radio bar and let them write their reports.187 To
end such abuses, the FCC, by a 4-3 vote, abolished the trial examiner’s
181

Newspaper Ownership Is Held No Bar to Broadcast Gains, BROADCASTING, Apr. 1, 1938,
at 22, 66.
182
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department, fired the chief trial examiner and one of his subordinates, and
transferred the remaining six trial examiners into the Law Department.188
Henceforth, one FCC lawyer would preside over a hearing, after which the
parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions. A single commissioner,
after reviewing reports from the staff and the presiding lawyer, would
recommend a disposition to the full commission, which itself then issued the
proposed findings and conclusions previously produced by the presiding
lawyer. The parties could file exceptions and request oral argument, after
which the commission issued its final order.189 Caldwell protested that, as a
practical matter, the memorandum prepared by the presiding lawyer disposed
of most cases, but the new procedure closely tracked a safe harbor Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes had identified in a leading case, and it survived until the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.190
VI. AN OLD-LINE LAW DEPARTMENT
McNinch boasted that the FCC was finally “going to town,”191 but it
would not get very far without “the bright New Deal boys” who elsewhere
supplied administrators with strategic intelligence.192 Three obstacles hampered Dempsey and Koplovitz’s attempts to hire them. The first was a rule
banning FCC lawyers from its roll of attorneys for two years after they left the
agency. The second was the civil service status of most FCC lawyers. The third
was the solicitude of congressional patrons for their constituents in the Law
188
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189
Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, supra note 59, at 1512; Confidential
Memorandum to All Attorneys 1 (Jan. 30, 1939), in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 378,
box 12; Herbert Bingham, Notes on Practice before the Federal Communications Commission, 38 MICH. L. REV. 339, 341–350 (1940). On the new procedures and the controversy
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Federal Communications Commission in 1938, written by Evan Mateer, a 2014 graduate of
the Georgetown University Law Center.
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on trial examiners and their implementation, consult Joanna L. Grisinger, The Administrative
Procedure Act and the Hearing Examiners, 34 J. NAT’ ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2014).
191
Going to Town, TIME, Nov. 21, 1938, at 40.
192
The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 389–90.

438

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2019

Department. The first obstacle was the agency’s own doing and easily undone,
but the other two plagued the FCC throughout McNinch’s chairmanship.
Until the summer of 1935, the commission’s lawyers, like those
elsewhere in the federal government, were free to leave and represent private
clients before their former agency as long as they did not do so in any claim
against the United States pending while they worked there.193 Less than a month
after Burton Wheeler denounced the revolving door at joint confirmation
hearings for the new commissioners, the FCC unanimously agreed that no
lawyer could present clients in any cause before the FCC for two years after
leaving the Law Department.194 Paul Spearman got out before the effective date,
but Gary, other FCC lawyers, and any new hires were bound by the rule.195
The two-year ban had an unintended consequence: it discouraged legal
recruits who did not envision spending their whole careers at FCC from taking
a job there. The problem surfaced when Felix Frankfurter urged James Landis,
newly appointed chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
to adopt a comparable rule for its lawyers. Landis replied that such a ban would
keep the SEC from hiring lawyers as good as those in corporate law firms. “We
are in a different position than Communications,” Landis explained, “and when
I look at some of their lawyers I shudder.”196 Evidently Dempsey shuddered,
too. He persuaded the commissioners to drop the ban in November 1938.197
A second obstacle was also of relatively recent origin. General counsels
at the FRC, as in most other federal agencies, had been free to hire and fire
lawyers without regard for the elaborate procedures of the U.S. Civil Service
193
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Commission.198 In contrast, the few general counsels with legal staffs within
the classified civil service could fire subordinates only for cause, a standard
that, as interpreted by civil service officials, the New Deal lawyers despaired
of meeting. Hiring procedures were even more constraining. Under them,
agencies were to notify the Civil Service Commission of open positions. The
Commission then announced the vacancies to law schools, bar associations,
state and municipal governments, newspapers, and post offices. Applicants
were directed to describe their educational background and professional career,
give references, and sit for a written examination. Prepared and graded by the
Civil Service Commission’s small staff of legal examiners, the exams quizzed
applicants on basic common-law subjects rather than relevant statutes or
administrative law. All who received a passing grade (70 out of 100) were
placed, in rank order, on a closed register, which the general counsel was not
allowed to consult. Under “the rule of three,” the Civil Service Commission
sent over the names and files of the three highest-ranked “eligibles” on the
register. A general counsel might try to persuade the Commission that none of
the three would do, but if he did, he could then choose only from among the
next three highest eligibles.199
Two other rules also blocked young Ivy league graduates from legal
positions in the classified legal service. First, veterans and in some cases their
spouses received extra points on the exam. Able-bodied veterans received an
extra five points and disabled veterans received ten points. Widows of veterans
and the wives of disabled veterans also received ten points. An able-bodied
veteran, therefore, needed only a score of 65 to pass a written examination,
while a disabled veteran or a widow needed only 60. In addition, any holder of
a ten-point preference with a passing score jumped to the top of the list. Thus,
a ten-point preference holder with a score as low as 60 was not only eligible
for appointment; the Civil Service Commission would certify him or her before
all competitors lacking the preference, regardless of the others’ scores.200
198
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A second political constraint was geographic. Eligibles from any state
or the District of Columbia with more than its share of appointments went to
the foot of a register, with the exception of holders of the veterans’ preference,
who stayed where they were. Not until all the eligibles from the underrepresented states were certified would the Commission proceed to the
eligibles from one of the overrepresented states. Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia invariably were overrepresented. They might be joined
by as many as fifteen other states, depending upon the constantly changing
balance of hires and separations throughout the entire civil service. In most
years, a Californian with a score of 70 would be certified before a Virginian
with a perfect score.201
Not surprisingly, general counsels at the new agencies insisted that
their lawyers be outside the classified civil service.202 Several expressed their
revulsion to its procedures at a meeting of chief legal officers later in the
decade. “No man wants to be dependent upon Civil Service Commission for
the selection of individuals for a job,” an unidentified attendee declared.
Another volunteered that no one present would “hire at any price” many who
managed to pass the Commission’s exam. “We want lawyers that will go to bat
for our program,” a third fumed. You “cannot determine that by an
examination.”203
In 1934 the FRC was in such ill repute that Congress ignored such
concerns and provided that in the new FCC only the general counsel, three
assistant general counsels, and temporary counsel hired for the performance of
special services would be outside the classified civil service. All other legal
positions would be filled in accordance with the civil-service laws or the
Classification Act of 1923.204 Thus, when the FCC sought to hire new lawyers
in 1935, the Civil Service Commission compiled registers using its standard
procedures. The first thirty-three positions on the register for junior attorneys
went to disabled veterans, of whom ten would have received a failing score but
for the ten-point preference. Other veterans took the next three places. The
candidate with the highest score on the exam (99.75) was thirty-seventh on the
register. Holders of the ten-point disability preference claimed the first three
201
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spots for a senior attorney position, the first fourteen spots for an attorney
position, and the first sixty-eight for an assistant attorney position.205
On that occasion the FCC circumvented the registers by making
temporary appointments and obtaining an executive order making them
permanent.206 This dodge was not easily repeated, however, and so McNinch
asked the Civil Service Commission to reconsider its interpretation that the
Communications Act of 1934 in fact subjected FCC lawyers to its procedures.
Unsurprisingly, the civil service commissioners declined to join in what a
political columnist characterized as Corcoran’s attempt to find berths for “all
his cronies from Harvard.”207 Dempsey and Koplovitz had an exemption
written into legislation pending before Congress, but the bill never escaped
committee.208 The pair were “ready to quit in despair,” presidential assistant
James Rowe reported to Corcoran in January 1939, because, Rowe claimed,
like all lawyers under the civil service, the FCC’s would not work past 4:30.209
A third obstacle to building a New Deal legal division was the
expectation of influential congressmen that the four best-paying legal
positions—the general counsel and three assistant general counsels—would be
filled by patronage appointees. Dempsey and Koplovitz’s selection as general
counsel and assistant general counsel in charge of the Law Department’s
Litigation and Administration Division bucked the trend, but patronage
appointees headed two other divisions throughout McNinch’s chairmanship.
George Porter was in charge of the large and politically sensitive Broadcast
Division. The son of a well-connected member of the ICC, he had worked at
the agency since 1931 and developed close relations with the radio bar.
Although Telford Taylor, Dempsey’s successor as general counsel, thought
Porter not without ability, he also considered him “not a very energetic
lawyer.” Another FCC lawyer described him as “what you’d call a ‘good
fellow.’”210 James A. Kennedy, in charge of the Common Carriers Division,
205
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was among the temporary appointees of 1934 made permanent by executive
order. The worst Taylor would say about him on the record was that he was
“not terribly imaginative,” but the South Carolinian was probably the “rather
senior lawyer” Taylor later identified as the appointee of Senators from a
Southern state. “[H]e was largely useless,” Taylor explained, “but it was just
very well known that if you didn’t keep him on his job there, all hell would
break loose with a couple of important Senators whose votes were of some
importance on legislation and appropriation.”211
VII. STALEMATE
Even if McNinch had had a solid phalanx of lawyers behind him, he
probably could not have pushed the FCC out of its swamp after the October
1938 purge. Quarrels among the commissioners over censorship, newspaper
ownership of radio licenses, and regulating the networks spilled into public
view and produced embarrassing reportage on the “dissension-wracked”
FCC.212 Further, as Rowe reported to the president’s secretary in January 1939,
McNinch was “a very sick man.”213 That his ravaged bowels severely limited
his activity soon became common knowledge.214
Corcoran urged Roosevelt to act. “Someone is going to make a proposal
to reorganize the Commissions,” Corcoran told Roosevelt after meeting with
211
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Senator Wheeler. “You should get the political credit for the courage of being
the first to and demand the cleaning up of the mess” at FCC. If Wheeler
moved before Roosevelt did, he would get the credit, because Commissioner
“Payne and the publicists on the other side are much cleverer than the people
on your side.”215
Roosevelt needed little convincing: in the midst of McNinch’s purge he
laughingly told Postmaster General James Farley that the FCC commissioners
were “crazy” and that he would be delighted if they all resigned.216 In a January
24th press conference, he said the administration was studying legislation to
restructure the agency.217 Although he refused to discuss which of several new
blueprints he preferred, one was reportedly a bill drafted by Corcoran and Cohen to
break up the FCC into a policymaking bureau situated within the Commerce Department and an independent quasi-judicial board like the Board of Tax Appeals.218
Such legislation was unlikely to pass, as congressional leaders, alarmed by the
misuse of relief funds in the elections of 1938, would have balked at conferring
so much patronage to a department under the president’s direct control.219
What did emerge was, in the parlance of the day, a “ripper bill,” a law
intended to remove officials by replacing an existing agency with a new one.220
Dempsey and Rowe wrote it one evening after Roosevelt and McNinch “had
conferred in desperation over the mess the Commission was in.”221 It would
replace the seven-member FCC with a three-member body and give its
chairman the power to hire and fire staff.222 Although Wheeler announced his
support and introduced it into the Senate, he then let it languish. “This was not
215
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1938, at 1.
219
See SMITH, supra note 9, at 160–89 (providing historical analysis regarding the congressional
concern over federal overreach during the New Deal era).
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See FCC Is Setting Up Defensive Works Against Congressional Investigation, TELECOM. REP.,
Nov. 1, 1938, at 5 (discussing the potential for “‘ripper’ legislation” to form a new agency with
new commissioners). See also S. 1268, 76th Cong. (1939) (providing a text of the bill).
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Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 6, 1941), in ROWE PAPERS, supra note 213, box 13.
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only because of his general attitude toward the President,” Rowe reported to
the White House, but also because Wheeler “was attempting to trade” inaction
on the radio bill for support of his investigation of railroad finances.223
Presumably his trading partner was the Republican Wallace White, who
objected that Wheeler’s bill would practically “vest in one man authority over
the vast communications interests of the country.”224 White introduced his own
bill to create an eleven-member commission, but lobbyists for the National
Association of Broadcasters kept both measures in committee.225
As the Wheeler and White bills stalled, a different way to reform the
FCC presented itself. In March 1939, Judge Sykes unexpectedly announced his
resignation.226 It was said that “internal friction” had finally grown too great
for “the ‘father-confessor’ of the FCC,” although perhaps Sykes wished to
avoid the attention a report on chain monopolies would bring to his support of
the networks.227 McNinch’s colonitis had worsened, making Corcoran, it was
said, “the real FCC boss.”228 The infirm chairman was sure to resign once his
successor was named.229 With the term of a third commissioner up in July,
FDR could remake the Commission and again forestall a congressional
investigation.230
223
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Seeks FCC “Purge,” White Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1939, at 2 (discussing White’s
prior bill proposals and intention to introduce a competing proposal to Wheeler’s bill).
226
Resignation of Sykes Accepted, AUSTIN AMERICAN, Mar. 11, 1939, at 7.
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230
See Richard Wilson, Push Radio Inquiry in Spite of Turmoil, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 30,
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This time Roosevelt needed a stronger chairman than Frank McNinch.
He would have to have the antimonopoly credentials to satisfy Burton Wheeler,
the political shrewdness to maneuver in a thoroughly partisan environment,
and the toughness to stand up to attacks from the broadcast networks’ wellfinanced lobbyists. Even then, the chairman would probably fail unless he had
a strong and dedicated legal staff that could ensure the accuracy of the
Commission’s records and the fidelity of the staff to the Commission’s new
policies. As it happened, Corcoran knew just the man.231
VIII. A NEW DEAL FOR THE FCC
The New Deal finally came to radio on September 1, 1939, the day
Germany invaded Poland and James Lawrence Fly became chairman of the
FCC. “Larry” Fly was born in 1898 into a rural community outside Dallas and
a network of politically active cousins scattered across the Upper South, all
descended from an adventurer who landed in Virginia in 1636.232 He graduated
from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1920, served in the Atlantic Fleet until 1923,
and then attended the Harvard Law School, graduating in 1926 with a B
average and the regard of Thomas G. Corcoran, who delighted in the Texan’s
tales of naval adventure.233 Fly worked for a time at a Wall Street law firm but
then joined the antitrust staff of Herbert Hoover’s Department of Justice.234
Although he labored mightily to succeed his boss John Lord O’Brian after
Roosevelt’s inauguration, the post went to a better connected but less able
Democrat. Never one to defer to those he did not respect—J. Edgar Hoover
231

See Thomas G. Corcoran, Personalities Involved in the Resignation of Chairman
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Pringle, The Controversial Mr. Fly, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jul. 22, 1944, at 40–41; Sol
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MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 1939, at 8 (describing James L. Fly’s visit to his brother, a county
judge); Letter from B. H. Fly, Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 1, to James Lawrence Fly
(May 2, 1933), in JAMES LAWRENCE FLY PAPERS, box 2 (on file with the Rare Book &
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complained that the young lawyer had told an FBI agent that someone should
“take me up a dark alley some night and give me the proper treatment, but that
this event would never happen because I never went out alone”—Fly sought a
job in one of the new agencies.235 With Corcoran’s help, he became General
Counsel of the Tennessee Valley Authority, where he acquired a reputation as
one of the New Deal’s toughest and most effective lawyers.236 A second bid to
be Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division in 1938 fell short
when the job went to Thurman W. Arnold, but the following year Corcoran
convinced Roosevelt that Fly was “the best man available” for the
chairmanship of the FCC.237
Telford Taylor, whom Fly would soon hire as General Counsel,
considered him the FCC’s “first really able chairman,” who set the
Commission “on its feet and gave it a prestige and a reputation for being up
and coming and grappling with problems that nobody’d ever done.”238 He
could be very charming but also “very dominant and overbearing, if he chose
to be.”239 He could “appear to lose his temper without really losing it—a very
useful quality to have.”240 Another FCC lawyer remembered him as “brilliant,
tough, honorable, and irascible”;241 others considered him “a fearsome guy,”
hard on all the lawyers appearing before the Commission but especially on his
own.242 Even so, his lawyers were proud of their work at Fly’s FCC, which
they recalled as a period of “great activity, lots of pressures, and a pretty deft
handling of the various problems as they arose from minute to minute and day
to day . . . .”243 Paul Porter, CBS’s lawyer and then Fly’s successor, claimed
the staff had “a kind of fierce faith in what Larry Fly was doing.”244
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Even before taking office, Fly found ways to get FCC lawyers out from
under the Civil Service.245 For example, the Communications Act allowed each
commissioner to hire a secretary without regard to the civil service rules.246 For
his, Fly chose Nathan David, a magna cum laude graduate of Yale College
who finished fourth in his class at the Harvard Law School.247 Because the
Civil Service Commission’s registers for FCC lawyers were five years old, Fly
repeated the dodge of hiring junior lawyers on a temporary basis until an
executive order in 1941 changed the status of lawyers across the federal
government.248 One way or another, Marcus Cohen (Chicago J.D. 1938,
Harvard LL.M. 1940), Philip Elman (Harvard LL.B. 1939), Thomas Harris
(Columbia LL.B. 1935), David Lloyd (Harvard LL.B. 1935), Lucien Hilmer
(Harvard LL.B. 1931), Leo Resnick (Columbia LL.B. 1937), and Oscar
Schachter (Columbia LL.B. 1939) were at work by the end of June 1940, albeit
only after their appointments had been staggered so as not to confront the
commissioners with too many Jewish surnames at once.249 Although they
thought of themselves as a “new breed of lawyer,” their kind had staffed other
alphabet agencies since the start of the New Deal.250
Fly also made changes at the top of the Law Department. Dempsey and
Koplovitz left in April 1940.251 On Corcoran’s recommendation, Fly named
Telford Taylor as General Counsel.252 The thirty-two-year-old had been an
editor of the Harvard Law Review, clerked for the federal judge Augustus
Hand, served on Jerome Frank’s legal staff at AAA, and helped Corcoran and
245
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Cohen draft the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.253 He was stuck in a
tedious investigation of railroads’ financial practices headed by Burton
Wheeler when the FCC job provided an escape.254 To take Koplovitz’s place
as “first” Assistant General Counsel, charged with resolving difficult legal
questions and clarifying matters of policy, Taylor chose Joseph Rauh, who had
led his class at the Harvard Law School, clerked for Cardozo and Frankfurter,
helped Corcoran and Cohen defend the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
and worked at the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.255
Rauh had very able lieutenants in Harry Plotkin (Harvard LL.B. 1937),
Schachter, and a third recruit, Seymour Krieger (Yale LL.B. 1938), who did
much of the work on a long-awaited report on the monopoly power of
broadcast networks.256 Philip Elman, assigned to the Broadcast Division while
253
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awaiting a clerkship with Justice Frankfurter, dispatched his assignments so
quickly that he had plenty of time to complete “odd jobs for Joe Rauh,”
including researching Roosevelt’s speeches.257 Taylor installed his college and
law school classmate Lucien Hilmer as Assistant General Counsel in charge of
the Broadcast Division in the summer of 1940 and replaced the politically wellfortified Kennedy with Benedict Cottone (Yale LL.B. 1933) atop the Telephone Division the following year.258
Thanks to what Cottone called this “great infusion of new blood,” the
Law Department became the vanguard of an ambitious and aggressive FCC.259
Fly believed his agency “should deal with the big and the fundamental things,”
one of his lawyers recalled. “[T]he little licensee who did something or didn’t
do something, carried too many commercial spot announcements or didn’t
carry enough public service programs—so what?”260 Thus, although Fly
redesigned the hearing room to make it more court-like and created an
investigation unit to check up on radio lawyers’ dubious factual claims, his
commission also lengthened the duration of licenses to a year and dispensed
with hearings for renewals and transfers.261
The streamlining of licensing procedures allowed Fly to concentrate on
more sweeping measures. His principal concern at the start of his chairmanship
was the monopolization of the airwaves.262 The Communications Act of 1934
257
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kept radio broadcasters subject to federal antitrust laws, but that had not
prevented CBS and NBC from controlling 87 percent of night-time radio
broadcasting.263 From November 1938 to May 1939, McNinch’s FCC held
seventy-three days of hearings on chain monopoly at which ninety-six
witnesses testified, but it promulgated no rules during his tenure.264 Paul Porter
dismissed the hearings as “a lot of self-serving declarations and economic
information.”265 In contrast, the Report on Chain Broadcasting, issued on May
2, 1941, hit hard. As Fly explained in a memo to the White House, “[t]wo men
([NBC’s David] Sarnoff and [CBS’s William] Paley) can say what more than
half of the people may or may not hear. . . . Democracy cannot rest upon so
frail a reed.”266 The report required NBC to sell one of its two networks,
reduced the maximum length of affiliation contracts, and limited “option time,”
claimed by networks for their own programming. The networks won a
concession on option time but still fought the rules all the way up to the U.S.
Supreme Court.267 There the FCC ultimately prevailed, in an opinion by Justice
Felix Frankfurter.268
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Fly also deftly handled a presidential desire with authoritarian overtones. Newspaper ownership of radio stations grew dramatically during the
1930s, from 6 percent in 1930 to 31 percent in 1939.269 In nearly 100 locales,
a newspaper owned the only radio station.270 Meanwhile, Roosevelt became
convinced that most newspaper publishers were arrayed against him. Only 41
percent of daily newspapers editorialized in favor of his election in 1932, only
37 percent did in 1936, and only 25 percent did in 1940.271 He found newspaper
coverage of the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and
other legislative landmarks of 1935 particularly galling. After his reelection,
he apparently had his aides inform the FCC of his opposition when a newspaper
he considered an egregious culprit applied for a license.272 In early 1939, his
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a member of an increasingly vocal antimonopoly faction within the administration, attacked the press as “America’s
House of Lords.”273 And in May 1939, Roosevelt himself released an interview in which he attacked newspapers and declared that “only through the
radio is it possible to overtake loudly proclaimed truths or greatly exaggerated
half truths.”274
Neither the FCC nor Congress rushed to support him. In January 1937,
then-General Counsel Hampson Gary opined that the FCC lacked the power to
adopt a ban under the Communications Act of 1934.275 A pro-administration
congressman promptly introduced a bill forbidding newspaper and magazine
publishers from owning radio stations, but neither that measure nor a similar
bill introduced in 1939 escaped committee.276
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Roosevelt, it seems clear, expected Fly to act without waiting for
Congress. As reported years later by Rowe, Fly claimed that Roosevelt had asked
him to pursue a ban, even though the president could not back him publicly. If
Fly “got in trouble,” he would be on his own.277 But Fly’s top priority was the
chain monopoly fight, and he did not want to jeopardize it by starting a brawl
with the press. Apparently, Roosevelt also decided not to give the publishers an
additional reason to accuse him of harboring dictatorial aspirations as he sought
a third term. A month after his reelection in November 1940, however, Roosevelt
pointedly asked Fly for an update.278 The FCC chairman replied that although
there should be “as many independent channels of information and communication as possible,” he needed time to plan hearings on the issue, lest they
seemed motivated by “punitive political considerations towards the press.”279
Rumor had it that Fly “did not really agree” with a press-radio ban.280
Still, in March 1941, his FCC put a hold on FM licenses to newspapers pending
hearings on what policies or rules, “if any,” were necessary.281 When the
hearing convened in July 1941, Fly announced that the FCC would proceed in
a “spirit of fact-finding.”282 He and his commissioners had not decided that a
rule was needed or, if so, whether it should come from the FCC or Congress.283
Between July and December 1941, the FCC devoted seventeen days to
hearings but then adjourned them without acting but also without lifting the
hold on FM licenses. Thereafter, the election of an anti-New Deal Congress in
277

The Reminiscences of James Rowe (Aug. 1, 1967), in FLY PROJECT, supra note 132, at 2.
Roosevelt’s daily calendar lists meetings with Fly on September 18, October 13, 23, and 30, 1939,
as well as December 21, 1939 and October 10 and November 11, 1941. Calendar, DAY BY DAY:
A PROJECT OF THE PARE LORENTZ CENTER AT THE FDR PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY,
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/ (last accessed Mar. 30, 2019). In another oral history,
Fly’s successor claimed that Roosevelt was “constantly putting the blowtorch on Larry” to ban
newspaper ownership. The Reminiscences of Paul Aldermandt Porter, supra note 244, at 18.
278
Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to James Lawrence Fly (Dec. 3, 1940), in FLY
PAPERS, supra note 232, box 1.
279
Memorandum on Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, supra note 270, at 1–2. See
also Memorandum on Radio Press Hearing from James H. Rowe, Jr., to Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Jan. 4, 1941), in ROWE PAPERS, supra note 213, box 13 (emphasis added)
(replying to FDR’s request for an update).
280
Pringle, supra note 232, at 41.
281
FCC, High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 1580 (Mar. 22, 1941). See also
STAMM, supra note 52, at 108–45 (describing the FCC’s newspaper-radio investigation);
BRINSON, supra note 262, at 44–47 (summarizing the FCC hearings to review newspaper
ownership of radio stations); PICKARD, supra note 267, at 45–51 (explaining the FCC’s
investigation of newspaper-owned radio).
282
Statement by Chairman James Lawrence Fly at Opening of FCC Radio-Press Hearing
(Jul. 23, 1941), at 3, in FLY PAPERS, supra note 232, box 26 (emphasis added).
283
Id.

Vol. 4:3]

The Shallow State

453

November 1942 and the antics of an outrageously partisan congressional
investigation, convened in July 1943 and headed by Eugene Cox, made a ban
was, as Rauh put it, “too much even for Larry Fly.”284 In January 1944, the
FCC announced it would adopt no special rule for newspaper ownership, “in
light of the record in this proceeding and of the grave legal and policy questions
involved.”285 Instead, it would continue to apply “the general principle that
diversification of control of [the] media is desirable.”286
World War II brought new responsibilities, pressure from the Department of Justice to engage in wiretapping, congressional red-baiting of FCC
employees, and the harassment of the Cox Committee.287 Still, during his five
years as chairman, Fly, assisted by his very able lawyers, made the FCC an
independent and powerful force against concentrated power in the media.
IX. FROM THE SHALLOW STATE TO THE DEEP STATE?
Franklin D. Roosevelt won the Democratic nomination for president in
1932 by excelling at rather than disrupting existing political practices.288 In his
first term, he did not renounce the patronage politics that got him elected. To be
sure, he named more university professors and elite professionals to federal jobs
than had his predecessors, but he also appointed many seasoned politicos whose
support he needed in Congress and to win reelection in 1936.289 His staffing of
the AAA, the National Recovery Administration, and other new agencies did
lead to complaints that “the faithful office holders of yesterday have been forced
to take a back seat and make room for the bright young men from Harvard and
Columbia,” but those appointments still left plenty of other jobs and patronage
for the party faithful.290 To service this constituency, then, Roosevelt initially left
the FCC becalmed within the Shallow State, subject to repeated boardings by
marauding bands of politicians, network lobbyists, and radio lawyers.
284
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During much of his second term, however, Roosevelt, angry with Congressional Democrats for opposing his Court-packing plan, experimented with
governing through a network of lawyers and other executive branch
officials.291 Cleaning up the FCC now struck him as good politics. He gave
Corcoran leave to try, but the FCC’s old-line Law Department was not up to
the task.292 Only after Fly, a member of the legal network, became chairman
and appointed aggressive, able, and ambitious lawyers to the Law Department
did FCC set sail.293 Congressmen did not stop calling, but their intercessions
counted for less during Fly’s chairmanship than they did during those of his
predecessors in the 1950s.294
If Fly’s “shock troops” rescued the FCC from the Shallow State, did they
imperil liberal democracy in the process? Scholars of “competitive authoritarianism” have observed that “[d]iscretionary economic power furnishes incumbents
with powerful tools to compel compliance and punish opposition.”295 Media
licenses have been among the most effective of these “economic policy levers,”
and they offer would-be authoritarians the additional advantage of controlling
the flow of information to the populace.296 Did FDR contemplate putting Fly’s
FCC to authoritarian ends? If so, did the chairman and his lawyers abet or resist
their president? And if Fly’s FCC heeded neither patronage-hungry congressmen nor Roosevelt’s occasional authoritarian impulses, did they pursue their
own agenda, like the shadowy conspirators of Deep State theorists’ fever dreams?
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The answer to each question, it seems, is no. First, although FDR did
pursue a ban on newspaper ownership of radio stations, his interest in individual licensing hearings was sporadic and idiosyncratic. The tangential
involvement of one of his sons apparently did prompt a White House inquiry
into a dispute over New York City’s WMCA.297 Roosevelt also instructed
Rowe to “get a stopper with Fly” on any move against the University of
Georgia’s license,298 and he interceded on behalf of a hard-pressed station in
Poughkeepsie, “not as President of the United States, but as a citizen of
Dutchess County!”299 But the FCC only occasionally figured in his political
calculations, and it figured in them even less as he readied the nation for war.
Rowe appreciated this when he reminded his boss that if he did not back Fly
he could expect to be “harassed day in and day out with the interminable details
of what in these times is an unimportant struggle from the point of view of the
President.”300
Second, although Fly was, in Rowe’s estimation, “the most loyal
supporter the President has,” he did not let loyalty keep him from slowing
FDR’s pursuit of the press-radio ban or from challenging the influence of the
president’s confidantes.301 For example, to circumvent press secretary Stephen
Early and another journalist temporarily ensconced in the White House, Fly
rushed the release of the chain monopoly report after getting Corcoran to elicit
what Fly could plausibly characterize as FDR’s approval.302 Fly’s forceful
297
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congressional testimony against the Department of Justice’s request for
broader statutory power to wiretap earned him a rebuke from Roosevelt that
left him scrambling to explain how, as Rauh ruefully put it, he could “commit
treason without fault.”303
Third, although the radio industry complained that the FCC went
“beyond any powers conferred in the law,” Fly and his shock troops carefully
gauged and stayed within the statutory and political limits set by Congress.304
When attacking the networks or opposing wiretapping, they could point to
specific provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 rather than simply the
“public convenience, interest, or necessity” standard.305 They also declined to
adopt a press-radio ban that lacked congressional support.306 The Cox
Committee did accuse the FCC of “arrogating to itself the determination of
matters of legislative policy resting solely within the competency of Congress,”
but even Louis Caldwell thought this charge baseless.307 Fly and his legal
lieutenants retained influential allies on Capitol Hill. Telford Taylor remained
close to his former boss, Burton Wheeler, who had urged the FCC to complete
the chain monopoly report and defended the FCC’s rulemaking authority.308
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man and claimed to have known his “family intimately for forty years.”309
Another powerful Texan in the House, Majority Leader Sam Rayburn,
protected Fly when a congressional investigation strayed into his personal
life.310 George Norris, the great progressive senator, praised Fly for his
“unlimited courage” in “almost endless legal fights with the monopolists.”311
In sum, the history of the FCC in the mid-twentieth century suggests
that an able, ambitious, and authoritative legal staff was not a threat to liberal
democracy in the United States but was necessary for the public-regarding
allocation and use of a valuable collective good. In the 1930s, the most pressing
challenge was not an authoritarian in the White House but political parties
centered in Congress and bound together by patronage, as well as the lobbyists
and lawyers who served industry’s and politicians’ needs. In a milder and more
localized form, radio regulation before Fly illustrates the point the political
scientist Stephens Holmes made more generally for Russia after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union: “state incapacity” can threaten liberal democratic values
quite as thoroughly as can “despotic power.”312
Today, a president more given to authoritarian impulses than Roosevelt
occupies the White House, and his political party in Congress is less inclined
to challenge him than were Democrats after the Court-packing plan. Further,
President Trump has castigated the FCC for balking at a merger sought by one
of his media supporters, and he has repeatedly denounced the media as “the
enemy of the people.”313 In such times, a point stated generally by Gillian
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Metzger but illustrated particularly by the midcentury history of the FCC is
especially apt. The very features of the administrative state that today’s critics
condemn, Professor Metzger observes, including “bureaucracy with its internal
oversight mechanisms and expert civil service, are essential for the
accountable, constrained, and effective exercise of executive power.” Fly and
his lawyers did not just, in Metzger’s words, enable “effective governance”;
they also “mitigate[d] the dangers of presidential unilateralism.”314 They
illustrated how government lawyers can steer their agencies into channels that
are neither shallow nor deep but liberal democratic.
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